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ABSTRACT

The second of three papers contained in a final report on New York State teachers' attitudes and mobility, this paper explores the effects of collective bargaining on teacher mobility by analyzing its effects on two determinants, personal preferences and personnel policies. Teacher attitudes are measured by responses on a national survey to questions concerning administrative decisions, support for teachers, instructional program effectiveness, and satisfaction with their workplace, while district policy measures include who makes hiring decisions and the level of teacher participation in decision-making. Analysis of teacher attitudes reveals that teachers covered by collective bargaining agreements ("union" teachers) are significantly less enthusiastic about their schools and less concerned with district personnel policies than those not covered. A maximum-likelihood logit analysis of teacher turnover (quits and transfers combined) by union affiliation yields the finding that mobility is similar among union and nonunion teachers, while analysis of union teacher turnover reveals significant relationships between turnover and contract provisions for class size and for staff reduction honoring seniority. The general conclusion is that, although the presence of collective bargaining has little effect on teacher turnover, staffing and class size contract provisions do affect mobility among covered teachers. (MJL)

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**The Effects of District Personnel Policies and Teacher Attitudes
on Teacher Mobility**

FINAL REPORT - Paper II

by

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The Effects of District Personnel Policies
and Teacher Attitudes
on
Teacher Mobility

The principal determinants governing teacher mobility have changed dramatically over the last three decades. During the 50s and 60s, when teachers were in short supply, personal factors governed the mobility of teachers. The abundance of teaching positions gave teachers the opportunity to move to positions that improved their salaries and working conditions. The late 60s and early 70s saw a reversal of the earlier trends. As enrollment growth turned to enrollment decline, teachers shifted their attention to trying to keep their jobs rather than trying to improve their positions. Thus, personal factors were replaced by district personnel policy governing layoffs and transfers as the major determinants of teacher turnover.

As pointed out in Murnane (1981) and Eberts (1982), many of these decisions are governed by institutional rules established either by state laws or locally negotiated collective bargaining agreements. Eberts (1982) explored the effect of collective bargaining provisions, in particular class size limitation provisions and reduction-in-force by seniority provisions, on the probability that teachers will transfer within a district or leave a district. He found that the class size provision increases the probability that a teacher will transfer but reduces the probability that a teacher will quit. The seniority provision, on the other hand, has little impact on quits and transfers except for teachers in slightly declining enrollment districts in which case it increases the probability that a teacher will leave the district.

Collective bargaining may have more subtle effects on teacher

turnover than were considered in Eberts (1982). In addition to establishing personnel policy, unions may alter the way district policy is administered and it may also alter the attitudes of teachers about their work.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of collective bargaining on teacher mobility through its effect on two determinants: personal preferences and personnel policy. The analysis is performed in two steps. The paper first considers the effects of collective bargaining on teacher attitudes and district policy. It then examines how these factors affect teacher turnover. The paper is based on data obtained from a national survey of over 3,000 elementary teachers in 200 districts. This data set is an improvement over data used by previous researchers since it provides information about teacher attitudes and district policy. Measures of teacher attitudes include responses to questions about administrative decisions, the support they receive from administrators, the effectiveness of the instructional program and satisfaction with their workplace. Measures of district policy include who makes hiring and firing decisions and the level of participation of teachers in the decision-making process. One drawback of the data is that transfers cannot be separated from quits. For the purposes of this paper, however, this is not a serious deficiency since both types of mobility stem from the same basic motivations.

District Personnel Policy and Teacher Hiring Decisions

Before exploring the effects of district personnel policy on teacher turnover, it is necessary to describe the decision-making process of the districts included in the study. Basically, three levels of decision-making are represented. The decision to hire or fire teachers is made either by (1) district administrators, (2) building administrators, or (3) building staff and individual teachers. Table 1 shows the percentage of districts and

Table 1
Distribution of Principal and Teacher Responses to Questions About Teacher
Personnel Decisions

Parties Making Hiring and Firing Decisions	Principal Responses		Teacher Responses	
	Number	Percentages	Number	Percentages
Individual Teachers	0	0	0	0
School Staff	2	1	18	1
Principal	30	17	398	16
District Staff	141	80	2023	81
Parents	2	1	32	1
Students	1	0	26	1
	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	177	100	2497	100

teachers which correspond to one of the three levels of decision-making. When principals were asked to indicate which parties were included in the hiring and firing decisions, 80 percent responded that district administrators were the principal authority. Seventeen percent of the principals reported that building administrators (principals) were responsible for this decision. Since the individual teacher is the unit of analysis when considering teacher turnover, the percentage of teachers employed by districts which follow the various administrative procedures is also important. Results show that the percentage of teachers coincides almost exactly with the percentage of districts under the various policies.

One would expect that the nature of the decision-making process may affect the freedom of teachers in moving between schools within districts. Teachers were asked how they happened to be assigned to the particular school they were currently working in. Three responses were recorded: Forty-three percent of the teachers reported that (1) "I chose to work in this school." Fifty-five percent replied that (2) "I was placed in this school." The remaining teachers said that (3) "This is the only school in the district in which I am qualified to teach."

The first two responses are good indicators of the freedom given to teachers in determining their own assignments. One would expect, therefore, to find a greater percentage of teachers who responded affirmatively to (1) to be from districts which decentralized the hiring and firing decisions by placing it in the hands of school principals. Districts which have centralized the hiring and firing decisions, on the other hand, would be expected to exercise greater control over teacher assignments. Table 2 compares the assignment procedure of teachers with the district personnel procedures. The hypothesis that teachers who chose their assignment came from districts with a decentralized personnel policy can be casually examined

Table 2
Distribution of Teacher Responses to Questions Concerning Teacher Assignment
and Personnel Decisions

Parties Making Hiring and Firing Decisions

Teacher Assignment	School Staff	Principal	District Staff	Parents	Students	Row %
Teacher Chose School	12 1.11 66.6	221 20.46 59.1	825 76.39 41.0	16 1.48 50.0	6 .56 23.08	44
Teacher Placed in School	6 .43 33.3	153 11.07 40.9	1187 85.89 59.0	16 1.16 50.0	20 1.45 76.92	56
Column Percentage	.73	15.19	81.72	1.30	1.06	

Note: First entry in each cell is the number of respondents; second is the row percentage; third is the column percentage.

by comparing the percentage of teachers in such districts who chose their assignment with the total percentage of teachers in the district. For example, given the distribution of teachers among the three types of personnel policies, one would expect that 16 percent of the teachers who chose their own assignments should be in districts which gave principals the hiring and firing authority. Table 2 shows, however, that 20 percent of the teachers were found in this type of district. For districts in which district administrators handle personnel matters, only 76 percent of the teachers who chose their assignment were in these districts compared with an expected 81 percent. Thus, there appears to be a positive relationship between decentralized decision-making and individual freedom to choose teaching assignments.

The level of teacher participation in decisions at the school level may also be important in determining individual choice in personnel matters. Teachers were asked to indicate their level of participation in deciding on teaching assignment in schools. Five responses were recorded with the corresponding percentages. (1) "Administrators decide with no input from teachers (47 percent)." (2) "Administrators decide after informal suggestions from teachers (26 percent)." (3) "Administrators decide after systematically getting input from teachers (12 percent)." (4) "Administrators and teachers jointly decide (13 percent)." (5) "Teachers decide with no input from administrators (1 percent)." Table 3 compares responses to these five levels of participation with the way teacher assignments were made. Tabulations show that a lower than expected percentage of teachers who chose their own school assignment came from schools in which principals made the decision with no teacher input. As teachers gained input into the decision process, a greater than expected percentage of teachers who chose their own assignment were represented.

Table 3
Distribution of Teacher Responses to Questions Concerning Teacher Assignment

Degree of Teacher Participation in Decision Process						Row Percentage
	1	2	3	4	5	
Teacher Chose School	426 39.4 36.2	302 28.0 45.8	156 14.4 51.2	185 17.1 56.6	11 1.0 37.9	43.3
Teacher Placed in School	735 53.2 62.5	348 25.2 52.8	143 10.4 46.9	138 10.0 42.2	18 2.3 62.1	55.4
Only School Teacher Qualified to Teach In	16 45.7 1.4	9 25.7 1.4	6 17.1 2.0	4 11.4 1.22	0 0 0	1.4
Column Percentage	47.14	26.4	12.2	13.1	1.16	

Note: A) First entry in each cell is number of respondents;
second entry is row percentage; third entry is column
percentage.

B) Coding for teacher participation:

- (1) Administrators decide with no teacher input
- (2) Administrators decide after informal suggestions
from teacher
- (3) Administrators decide after systematically getting
input from teacher
- (4) Administrators and teachers jointly decide
- (5) Teachers decide with no input from administrators

Casual observation, therefore, suggests that the freedom of teachers to make their own decisions concerning assignments is best served in an environment of decentralized decision-making and teacher participation. To formalize this notion more fully, a logit analysis is performed to determine the factors which best promote individual freedom in choosing assignments.¹ The dependent variable in the equation is the odds of a teacher choosing his or her own assignment. To capture the type of decision-making in the district, a variable (HF) is included which equals one if principals have hiring and firing authority and zero if district administrators deal with this matter. The level of teacher participation (DECISION) is measured by the relative amount of teacher input into decisions made at the school level. Unionization may also affect the manner in which personnel decisions are determined and administered. Thus, both HF and DECISION are interacted with the union variable (which equals one if teachers are covered by a collective bargaining agreement and zero if not). The teacher's level of seniority may also be important in the degree of freedom the teacher enjoys in changing assignments. As found in Murnane (1981), the most senior teachers have the first refusal of a vacated position, if they desire to transfer. Given this pecking order of transfers, one would expect that senior teachers will be more likely to choose their present assignment than junior teachers. The experience level of teachers (EXP) is included for this reason. District size (SIZE) and unionization (UNION) are also included to account for other differences in district policies and behavior of teachers.

The results shown in Table 4 support the hypothesis that decentralized decision-making and teacher participation promote the freedom of teachers to choose their own assignment. The coefficient on HF and DECISION is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level which

Table 4
Logit Estimation of the Odds that An Individual Teacher Chose to Work in
Present Assignment

Variable	Definition	Mean	Coefficient
Constant			-1.15 (5.52)
Size	District Enrollment	64438	2.2 E-7 (.63)
HF	Equals one if principal has hiring authority equals zero if district administrators have authority	.72	.31 (2.51)
U* HF	Union * HF	.26	-.027 (.13)
Decision	Teacher participation in decision process	1.95	.26 (5.62)
U* Decision	Union * Decision	.68	.03 (.31)
Union	=1 If teacher represented by bargaining unit	.64	.22 (.66)
Exp	Experience level of teacher	11.26	.03 (4.85)

F = 9.02 (7, 2471)

indicates that the odds of a teacher choosing his own position is higher when principals make the hiring and firing decisions and when teachers increase their level of participation in the decision process. Unionization, on the other hand, has no direct effect on choice in assignments (the coefficient on UNION is statistically insignificant) and has no indirect effects either through district policy or school-based decision-making (the interacted variables are insignificant). The experience of teachers is the only other variable whose coefficient is statistically significant. Consequently, the structure of the decision-making in the district is important in determining teacher freedom in assignment choices.

Teacher Perceptions of District Policy and School

One of the reasons cited most often for collective action on the part of teachers is the need for a feeling of control over their work environment. This desire certainly ranks high among other employees who seek union membership. Warner, Chisholm, and Munzenrider (1978) studied unionized social service workers and found that 70 percent of those surveyed were concerned about treatment by supervisors, and 75 percent said they joined a union to protect their jobs. Most surveys of teachers, however, do not directly address the issue of unionization. Surveys that have been performed look at the values teachers place on certain aspects of their jobs. For example, Herndon (1976), Lortie (1977), Duke et. al (1979) and Alutto and Belasco (1974) reveal that teachers derive much psychological value from pedagogical and professional activities. Others [e.g. Steele (1976), Donley (1976), McDonnell and Pascal (1979)] have found that educators perceive the need for increased pay, better working conditions, and greater job security. Given this wide range of preferences, the conscious effort of unions to participate in district decision-making as well as promote job security and

higher salaries for its members is understandable.

The purpose of this section is to explore differences in perceptions of their workplace between teachers covered and not covered by collective bargaining. Over 2000 teachers were asked to respond to a number of questions concerning attitudes about their working environment. The questions address two specific aspects: attitudes about administrative decisions and conduct of administrators; and attitudes about the effectiveness of the school. Two questions fall under the first category.

(1) How satisfied are you with the way most decisions are made in your school? Teachers responded in the following way: very satisfied (31 percent), somewhat satisfied (57 percent), and not satisfied (12 percent). (2) Which phrase best describes your principal's (or other members of the administrative staff) support of your work as a teacher? The distribution of responses were: very supportive (59 percent), somewhat supportive (25 percent), neutral (9 percent), somewhat unsupportive (5 percent), and very unsupportive (3 percent). Questions related to the second category ask teachers to indicate their general feelings (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree) about the following statements. (1) Teachers in this school conduct effective instruction (26 percent, 65 percent, 2 percent, and 7 percent, respectively). (2) Teachers in this school work well together (28,55,2,13). (3) The school is a satisfying place in which to work (30,53,3,11). (4) The programs are successful in meeting students' needs (23,53,6,14).

The means of the responses to these questions are displayed in Table 5 by union affiliation. In all cases except the question related to effective instruction, teachers covered by collective bargaining were significantly less enthusiastic about their schools than teachers not covered. (The difference in responses to the "effective instruction" question

Table 5
Difference in Means of Responses of Union and Nonunion Teachers

	Union	Nonunion	T-Statistic
Satisfaction w/decisions	2.15	2.26	-4.01
Administrative Support	4.26	4.43	-4.25
Successful Programs	2.42	2.66	-5.68
Effective Instruction	3.07	3.09	-.57
Work Well Together	2.92	3.00	-2.04
Satisfying Place	2.89	3.07	-4.53

Note: T- Statistic computed assuming equal variances.

is not statistically significant.) For example, when asked about their satisfaction with administrative decisions, the average response of teachers covered by collective bargaining was 2.15 whereas the average response for nonunion teachers was 2.26.² The difference between the means is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.³

Collective bargaining contracts may alter the structure of district policy and attitudes of teachers about the way the district is run. To capture these differences, teachers covered by bargaining agreements were divided into two groups, those covered by staffing and class size provisions and those not covered. Responses to the questions listed above about administrative policy and support and attitudes about the work place were tested to see if the means were statistically different. Only in two cases, administrative support and ability to work well together, did teacher responses differ significantly. Teachers covered by staffing and class size provisions felt that administrators were more supportive than teachers not covered. Teachers covered by the provisions, on the other hand, felt less able to work well together with their colleagues than teachers not covered.

Teacher attitudes towards administrators and their working conditions were attributed to a number of factors. Regression analysis was used to indicate the direction of influence of these factors on attitudes and their level of statistical significance. By dividing the analysis into the responses of teachers covered by collective bargaining and those not covered, a number of interesting differences between the two sets of teachers emerged. The results are shown in Table 6. Both union and nonunion teachers placed the same weight on teacher participation in decision-making as contributing towards their attitudes about administrative support and satisfaction with decisions. In both cases, teachers who placed greater importance on teacher participation were less satisfied with decisions or with administrative

Table 6: Regression Analysis of Determinants of Selected Teacher Attitudes, by Union Affiliation

	Union Nonunion Satisfaction w/ Decisions		Union Nonunion Satisfying Place		Union Nonunion Admin. Support		Union Nonunion Programs Successful		Union Nonunion Effective Instruction		Union Nonunion Work Well Together	
Importance of Teacher Participation (I)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Teacher Participation (D)												
D* I		+				+		+		+	+	
Hired to Specific School		(+)		+		(+)			(-)			
Hired by System/ Given Choice		+	-		(-)	+					-	(-)
Both School Need and Choice		+									+	
Teacher/School Staff	+											
Parents/Students			+			+		(-)		-	+	
Choose School	+	+	+	+	+	+						+
Class Size	-		-		-		-	-		(-)		
# Grades		+	+					+		+		+
Exp/Pupil	(-)	-		-		-			+		+	-
Space									+	+	+	+
Secon												
Mrace	+		+		+		+		+		+	
Mecon			+	+			(+)	+		+		+
Mval	(+)											
Sval				+				+			-	(+)
R ²	.14	.10	.14	.08	.08	.07	.10	.09	.06	.07	.10	.08

Note: Plus or minus sign in parentheses indicate that the coefficient is significant at .10 level; otherwise significant at .05 level.

- (1) The variables Mrace and Space are the means and standard deviations respectively of the distribution of white students in the classroom.
- (2) The variables Mecon and Secon are the means and standard deviations respectively of the distribution of Orshansky Poverty index associated with students in each classroom. Lower value of index is associated with greater poverty.
- (3) The variables Mval and Sval are the means and standard deviations, respectively of the difference between post- and pre-test scores of students in each classroom.

support, holding constant the level of actual teacher participation. Also, the ability to choose their assignment raised teachers' attitudes about decisions and administrative support.

Nonunion teachers let personnel policies enter into their attitudes about decisions and administrative support whereas union teachers did not. Union teachers, on the other hand, were more concerned with racial composition of schools. Union teachers felt better about decisions and administrative support as the percentage of non-minority students increased.

Union and nonunion teachers also differed about the ingredients which make their school a satisfying place in which to work. Union teachers were concerned about class size whereas nonunion teachers were not. The racial composition of the student body also figured positively into union teachers' assessment of their working environment while remaining unimportant to nonunion teachers. Both groups of teachers were positively swayed by the economic status of the students and the ability to choose their own teaching assignment. As before, teachers who felt strongly about participating in decisions were less satisfied with their working environment than teachers who gave participation a lower priority.

The results suggest that the union status of teachers affects how they assess their working conditions. Teachers covered by collective bargaining appear to be less concerned with the personnel policies of the district than their nonunion colleagues. Perhaps this lack of interest is due to a greater reliance placed on the union to take care of personnel matters as well as more structured personnel practices in union districts. Union teachers, on the other hand, were more sensitive to class size and the racial composition of the students than nonunion teachers. Concerns about class size probably result from a conscious attempt on the part of unions to educate teachers to be sensitive to this issue since it is a focal point in

contract negotiations.

Attitudes, District Policy, and Teacher Turnover

The effect of teacher attitudes and district personnel policy on teacher turnover can be explored by explaining quits and transfers with a subset of the variables discussed above. The odds that a teacher will either transfer between schools within a district or leave the district (CHANGE) takes the implicit form:

$$(1) \quad P(\text{CHANGE}) = f(X)$$

where $P(\text{CHANGE})$ is the probability that a teacher changes positions and X represents a vector of variables recording teacher attitudes and attributes, district personnel policy. First, teacher mobility is determined by personal preferences. The principal factor considered here is the teacher's satisfaction with his or her present position. One would expect that teachers who are more satisfied with their present position are less apt to move. Three areas of satisfaction are included: satisfaction with decisions (SATDEC), success of the instructional programs (SUCCESS), and overall satisfaction (SATALL). Due to human capital considerations and seniority rules [see Greenberg and McCall (1973), Murnane (1981), or Eberts (1982)], teacher mobility should be inversely related to the experience level of teachers. Three categorized experience variables are included in the analysis (EXP1--one year or less, EXP23--2 or 3 years, EXP45--4 or 5 years, with 6 years or greater included in the intercept). District policy is accounted for with two variables, HF and DECISION (defined earlier). District size (SIZE) is also included to account for employment opportunities related to district size and also size-related differences in administrative policies.

Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the equation are not

efficient when the dependent variable takes on qualitative values (e.g. 0-1 values for transfers or quits). In addition, OLS estimates of standard errors of the coefficients are not consistent. Thus, a maximum-likelihood logit technique is used to account for the qualitative nature of the dependent variable. The probability that teacher j changes positions is assumed to be expressed by

$$(2) \quad p_j (\text{CHANGE}) = \exp(b'X_j) / (1 + \exp(b'X_j))$$

where $b'(X)$ is a vector of coefficients (explanatory variables).

Union/Nonunion Differences in Teacher Turnover

To examine the effect of teacher unions on teacher turnover, the sample of elementary teachers was separated into those who were covered by a master contract negotiated with a recognized bargaining unit and those who were not covered.⁴ Maximum-likelihood estimates of the logistic specification of the determinants of CHANGE are presented in Table 7 for both groups. Since the dependent variable is the logarithm of the odds that a particular choice will be made, the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of the respective variables on the odds of changing positions. The effect of unions can be estimated by calculating the difference in coefficients across the two samples.

As expected, experience and overall satisfaction about current position (SATALL) are positively and significantly related to CHANGE. Teachers who are satisfied with their present position are less likely to move, and if they do, the more junior teachers are more likely to leave than the more senior persons.⁵

Table 7
Logit Analysis of Teacher Turnover, By Union Affiliation

Variable	Definition	Mean		Coefficient	
		Union	Nonunion	Union	Nonunion
Constant				-1.25 (4.35)	-.83 (2.05)
Size	District Enrollment (X1000)	67.4	59.08	.0003 (.467)	-.0005 (.68)
HF	=1 If Principal Has Hiring Authority =0 Otherwise	.71	.74	-.29 (1.76)	-.10 (.56)
Decision	Teacher Participation in Teacher Assignment	1.96	1.92	.072 (1.22)	-.066 (.81)
EXP1	Teacher Has 1 Yr. Exp.	.12	.18	1.16 (6.24)	1.00 (4.37)
EXP23	Teacher Has 2 or 3 Yrs. Exp.	.10	.12	.84 (4.16)	.89 (3.40)
EXP45	Teacher Has 4 or 5 Yrs. Exp.	.26	.25	.40 (2.54)	.57 (2.60)
SATDEC	Satisfaction With Administrative Decisions	2.15	2.26	-.058 (.48)	-.12 (.73)
Success	Successful programs	2.42	2.67	.087 (1.20)	.097 (1.00)
SATALL	Satisfying Place to Work	2.89	3.07	-.202 (2.81)	-.243 (2.38)

Dependent Variable: Odds of Quitting or Transferring

<u>Union</u>	<u>Nonunion</u>
.20	.21

F(9,1588)=6.89 F(9,875)=3.56

NOTE: ASYMPTOTIC T-Statistics in Parentheses.

None of the other coefficients in the analysis were statistically significant. The coefficient on HF and DECISION were in the anticipated direction for union teachers but not significant at a reasonable confidence level.

When the coefficients associated with union teachers were compared with the coefficients of nonunion teachers, the difference between the two samples was not statistically significant. (The t-statistics of the difference in coefficients are not shown in Table 7 since all are insignificant at any reasonable confidence level.) Thus, the findings indicate that the mobility behavior of union and nonunion teachers are the same.

Class Size and Staffing Provisions

Eberts (1982) found that class-size-limitation provisions and reduction-in-force provisions significantly affect teacher turnover in unionized districts. The same may be true for this national sample of elementary school teachers. Differences in behavior were tested by first estimating the coefficients for teachers covered and not covered by staffing and class size provisions. The results are displayed in Table 8. Compared with the coefficients obtained from the union/nonunion dichotomy, the differences between coefficients are striking. Control of hiring and firing decisions (HF) by principals reduces the likelihood of a change in position for teachers covered by staffing or class size provisions but has no significant effect on teachers not covered. Only first year teachers are more likely to transfer than teachers with 6 years or greater experience when not covered by staffing or class size provision whereas teachers with 1 to 5 years experience are more likely to change positions when covered by the provisions. These differences in coefficients are statistically significant

Table 8
Logit Analysis of Teacher Turnover of Union Teachers, By Class Size and Staffing Provision

Variable	Definition	Mean		Coefficient		T-Statistic of Difference in Coefficients
		Provision	No Provision	Provision	No Provision	
Constant				-1.14 (2.88)	-1.57 (3.24)	.68
Size	District Enrollment (X1000)	61.28	74.11	-.0012 (.87)	.0016 (2.02)	1.76
HF	=1 If Principal Has Hiring Authority =0 Otherwise	.67	.76	-.52 (2.58)	.25 (.77)	2.02
Decision	Teacher Participation in Teacher Assignment	2.07	1.84	.042 (.54)	.103 (1.12)	.51
EXP1	Teacher Has 1 yr. Exp.	.13	.11	1.22 (4.78)	1.09 (3.89)	.34
EXP23	Teacher Has 2 or 3 yrs. exp.	.08	.13	1.44 (5.08)	.28 (.92)	2.79
EXP45	Teacher Has 4 or 5 yrs. exp.	.24	.29	.72 (3.28)	.083 (.35)	1.97
SATDEC	Satisfaction with Administrative Decisions	2.18	2.12	.024 (.15)	-.163 (.88)	.76
Success	Successful Programs	2.43	2.41	.083 (.85)	.062 (.57)	.14
SATALL	Satisfying Place to Work	2.90	2.87	-.22 (2.12)	-.174 (1.63)	.31
				F	5.02	3.53
Dependent Var: Odds of Quitting or Transferring		.21	.18			

NOTE: ASYMPTOTIC T-Statistics in Parentheses. Provision refers to the presence of class size and staffing concerns in contract; and no provision refers to the absence of such provisions.

at the 0.05 level.

Conclusion

Teacher unions have increasingly become partners with school administrators in establishing school policy. Class-size-limitation provisions and personnel-related provisions are common topics at the bargaining table. Eberts (1982) found that class-size-limitation provisions and reduction-in-force by seniority provisions do affect teacher turnover. This paper continues that investigation by examining more subtle influences of unions on teacher mobility, in particular, the effect of collective bargaining on teacher attitudes and district personnel policy. The basic conclusion is that the presence of collective bargaining has little discernible effect on teacher turnover. No statistically significant difference between the estimated coefficients of teachers covered and not covered by collective bargaining could be found.

These results should not be interpreted, however, to indicate that collective bargaining has no effect. The presence of staffing and class size provisions in contracts, on the other hand, does appear to affect teacher mobility among teachers covered by a collective bargaining contract. Thus, the specific provisions present in a contract appear to have a greater effect than the mere existence of a contract. This conclusion corroborates past research by Eberts (1983) which shows that the content of the contract is as, if not more, important than the difference in behavior of union and nonunion teachers.

Analysis also uncovered differences in attitudes between union and nonunion teachers. Union teachers, for example, were less concerned about personnel policy than nonunion teachers but more concerned about class size. In addition, union teachers appeared to be less satisfied in general about

their workplace than nonunion teachers. Although these differences in attitudes and perceptions were significant, the differences did not appear to be large enough to register any significant influence on turnover behavior of union and nonunion teachers.

Footnotes

- ¹ See the description of logit analysis in Eberts (1982) or consult Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1976) for a general presentation.
- ² The average score is computed by assigning a '3' to the response 'very satisfied,' assigning a '2' to the response 'somewhat satisfied' and a '1' to the response 'not satisfied at all.'
- ³ The obvious question raised by these findings is whether teacher attitudes lead to unionization or the fact teachers are unionized affects their attitudes. Farber and Saks (1980) found that individual's expectations about the effect of unions on the nonwage aspects of their working conditions affected their vote for unionization in local NLRB elections. For example, if individuals felt that unionization would cause a deterioration of the currently satisfactory supervisory relationships then they would be less likely to vote for unionization. This paper takes the stance that the attitudes of the majority of teachers have already been voiced in a union ratification election and that the status of the district (e.g. union or nonunion) reflects the majority preferences. Teachers who are not satisfied with the decision either leave the district or remain on the fringes of the prevailing opinion. Assuming that the structure of the district decision-making process is exogenous for both union and nonunion districts, we explore the effect of this structure on the decision to either transfer within districts or leave the district.
- ⁴ Although we recognize that teachers who are represented by a recognized bargaining unit are not necessarily members of the union, for expositional purposes we will refer to a teacher who is covered by a negotiated contract to be a "union" teacher.
- ⁵ The result that the odds of changing positions are inversely related to experience level compares favorably with results obtained by Murnane (1981) and Eberts (1982).

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